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THE CRIME WAR. By Robert M. Cipes. New York: World. 1968.
Pp. xiv, 207. $5.50.
I.

THE WAR THEORY OF CRIME CONTROL

To those who insist that our society is waging a "war on crime,"
Robert Cipes' book, The Crime War, may be considered treason.
His purpose is to show "some of the short-range consequences and
the long-range dangers" (p. xi) of the war theory of crime control,1
1. The idea that society must wage a "war" against crime is an old concept which
entails many implicit assumptions about how the criminal should be treated. In a
recent article, Do Police Sometimes Practice "Civil Disobedience" Too?, TRIAL, Oct.Nov. 1968, at 15, Professor Yale Kamisar, a consistent opponent of the war theory,
cited the following passage from E. HOPKINS, OUR LAWLESS PouCE 319 (1931) as "the
most incisive description" of the theory:
Being the enemy, he [the criminal, or more accurately, the persons accused or
suspected of crime] has no rights worthy of the name. He is to be met by the
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and his method is a forthright attack on the foundation of that
theory. In the rebellious tone of a man who is fed up with propaganda, Cipes rejects the popular notion that the criminal is the
"enemy" and shifts his focus from the "psychology and morals of
the so-called criminal to the psychology and ·morals of those who
have been set up to prosecute, judge, and punish him" (p. xi). He
argues that the use of war terminology infuses the administration
of criminal justice with a war psychosis which results in the loss of
important civil liberties.2 Moreover, he seeks to prove that the concept of a "war" is based entirely upon false assumptions about the
nature and extent of crime-assumptions which he contends were
deliberately created by self-seeking politicians, prosecutors, newspapermen, and law enforcement officials. The Crime J,Var is an ambitious attempt to neutralize the massive pro-war publicity which
has been successful in molding the public's attitude toward crime.
In our fear-charged times, the strong voice of one who has not
lost sight of libertarian goals is essential. However, the measure of
Cipes' contribution must be found not in his courage but in his
ability to persuade the public that the simplistic solutions offered
by the warmongers are unjustified and misconceived. My own
view is that The Crime War will not have a substantial impact
on public attitudes toward crime control because it relies too
heavily upon minimization of the crime problem as a means of
reducing the attractiveness of oppressive police tactics.
It is probably true that the American public is virtually paranoid about crime; yet whether or not this paranoia is justified by
the facts is irrelevant. As Dean Francis Allen of the University of
Michigan Law School has stated:
The stark and inescapable fact is that the feeling of security has
suffered serious erosion in American society; and perhaps the most
weapons of war. Individual rights, including those of non-combatants, are subject
to invasion like the rights of non-combatants in wartime. The policeman is a
peacetime soldier. If bullets go astray, if civilians are inconvenienced, if civil
rights are suspended, those are accidents inherent in a warfare that is waged in
crowded cities. Criminologists of the humanitarian class are to be scorned, because they are the Pacifists in this war. Defense attorneys are to be frustrated
and outwitted because they are the enemy's diplomatic corps. Critizens who
would make objection to the excess of authority indulged in for the protection
of the public are giving aid and comfort to the enemy. If the Constitution forbids internal war, then the Constitution is technical and pettifogging, and for its
own good it must be protected against itself. Its makers in any case could not
have foreseen the pass to which this war has come. The law of war is the law of
necessity. There are certain rules of war, but they do not strictly bind, and atrocities are only to be deprecated because they may become public and hurt the
cause-not because the enemy is entitled to the least consideration.
2. Cf. Goldberg, Can We Afford Liberty?, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 665 (1969), in which
in the attempt to find solutions to the problem "has led to drastic measures; among
them have been various proposals to amend the Constitution or legislatively overrule
recent Supreme Court interpretations of it ••••"
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significant consideration is this sense of insecurity, whatever reality
a valid statistical analysis might reveal. As insecurity has increased,
indignation has intensified: hence the mounting denunciations of
lawlessness and demands for its forcible repression.3

Thus, I am afraid that, while Cipes may be quite right in asserting
that public fear of crime is excessive and unrealistic, reinterpretation of the crime statistics will not change the minds of those who
"know" that they are not safe in a subway, underground garage, or
public park. In short, The Crime War is the kind of book that is
likely to cause those who already agree with the author to nod knowingly while those who disagree will dismiss it as liberal claptrap.
The primary thrust of the book is an assertion that the "crime
crisis" which is at the root of the war theory is the result of an
exaggerated view of the crime problem. "If a real emergency exists,"
the author states, "the authorities must adopt emergency measures
to deal with it. But if in fact there is no crime wave, then there
would be no justification in suspending civil liberties, in increasing
powers of the police and the destructiveness of their weapons, nor
any necessity for escalating punishments and tightening security
over convicted offenders" (p. 4). 4 With this reasoning as a basic
premise, Cipes assigns himself the task of persuading the public that
there is no crisis and that therefore no extraordinary powers are
needed. 5
3. Statement Before the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of
Violence, Washington, D.C., Oct. 30, 1968, reprinted in 12 I.Aw QUADRANGLE NOTES,
Fall 1968, at 5, 6 (University of Michigan publication). Dean Allen's view seems to be
reflected in the Progress Report of the Commission according to Drew Pearson who
quotes the unpublished report as follows: "The intricacies of crime statistics have
little meaning for the average citizen...• He appears less impressed with numbers
and rates and trends than with the fact that there seem to be increasingly large
sections of his city where he cannot walk safely even in daylight, much less at
night •..•" Detroit Free Press, Jan. 28, 1969, at II-A, col. 1.
4. Professor Warren Lehman makes a similar point:
All the rhetoric of the Great Society aside, it is a rather different thing to
assert that as a society we have fallen away from standards that had been earlier
attained than to assert that we must become suddenly, say, twenty-five per
cent better than we ever have been before to solve the crime problem. The
possibility of return to a previous height is a little less problematical than
that of achieving a height not before attained. . . . If • • • it is true that we are
getting worse, that in prosperous middle age our national morality has come unhinged, we could conceivably decide that we want to be saved from ourselves
regardless of the cost in otherwise unpalatably efficient and professional policing,
distasteful invasion of privacy, and inhuman remorselessness in prosecution.
Lehman, Crime, the Public, and the Crime Commission: A Critical Review of the
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1487, 1514 (1968). This position concedes too much. It implicitly suggests that the granting of extraordinary police
powers would be justified if there were a bona fide crime crisis. Whether or not there
is a crisis, there will always be a substantial interest in preventing the use of police•
state techniques, and each proposal must be carefully studied to determines its
long-range effects upon society as well as its short-range efficiency. Moreover, Cipes'
statement quoted in the text appears to assume the utility of suspending civil liberties,
increasing police powers, and escalating punishments in time of emergency.
5. This tactic seems to be the instinctive response of those who seek to protect
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CRIME CRISIS STATISTICS

In disputing the assertion that we are in the midst of a crime
crisis, Cipes relies heavily upon the Report of the President's Crime
Commission. 6 He emphasizes that the statistics contained in that
report reflect more sophisticated data collection techniques than
were previously available, an increased willingness of victims to report crime, the growing proportion of juveniles in the population
(traditionally the largest per capita source of crime), and the increasing trend toward urbanization.7 This analysis is designed to demonstrate two points: (1) that crime has not increased nearly as much as
the statistics indicate; and (2) that the actual increase in crime is due
to normal population growth and redistribution patterns rather
than to a change in societal standards. Although this approach puts
the crime problem in a more accurate perspective, 8 it does little to
assuage the growing public fear created by the demonstrable increase in crime. Moreover, according to the Crime Commission,
these factors do not account for much more than half of the increase. 9
Cipes points out that the figures indicating a massive rise in
crime do not justify the panic they have engendered because a careful analysis of victims shows that the risk of being subjected to a
violent crime occurs in patterns which tend to exclude the very
persons who are most sensitive and vocal about their fears. It is the
white suburbanite who makes the loudest demands for police prothe criminal justice system from unwarranted attacks based on fear. As early as 1926,
Clarence Darrow publicly disputed allegations that crime was out of hand by making
a thorough analysis of the "fallacious" basis of the crime wave theory. Darrow, Crime
and the Alarmists, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Oct. 1926, at 535. More recently, Professor Kamisar utilized the same approach in a series of articles and lectures: Public
Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories", 53 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
171 (1962); On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49
CORNELL L.Q. 436 (1964); JVhen the Cops Were Not Handcuffed", N.Y. Times, Nov. 7,
1965, § 6 (Magazine), at 34. See also Bell, What Crime Wave?, FORTUNE, Jan. 1955, at
96; Cook, There's Always a Crime Wave-How Bad Is This One?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6,
1968, § 6 (Magazine), at 38.
6. PREsIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967) [hereinafter REPORT].
7. Judge George Edwards of the Sixth Circuit (former Police Commissioner of the
City of Detroit) attributes the increase in crime to "increasing urbanization of our
country; the increasing insistence of the United States Supreme Court on strict compliance by the police with the principles of the Bill of Rights; the vast and continuing migration of millions of Negro citizens, principally from southern rural areas to
the great metropolitan centers; and the civil rights revolution of the 1960's . • . ."
Edwards, Order and Civil Liberties: A Complex Role for the Police, 64 MICH. L. REv.
47, 48 (1965).
8. Chief Justice Roger J. Traynor of the California Supreme Court has emphasized
the need for such a perspective: "'We may never reach a definitive consensus on the
interpretation of crime statistics enveloped in so complicated a background. Nevertheless we have a responsibility at least to read the statistics in the perspective of correlative data.'' Traynor, Lawbreakers, Courts, and Law-Abiders, 31 Mo. L. REV. 181, 185
(1966).
9. REPORT 29.
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tection; yet the slum dweller is much more likely than he is to be
the victim of a violent crime. 10 The persons who suffer at the hands
of the violent criminal are also predominantly black; a Negro man
in Chicago, for example, assumes nearly six times the risk of being
subjected to an aggravated assault as a white man, while a Negro
woman is eight times more likely to be assaulted than her white
counterpart.11 In addition, the likelihood of being attacked by a
stranger is substantially less than the statistics might suggest because
the "risk of serious attack from spouses, family members, friends, or
acquaintances is almost twice as great as it is from strangers on the
street. " 12
There are times, however, when Cipes' assertions strain credibility. For example, he states that "[d]espite popular assumption
individual violence in American life is declining. But not the tendency toward collective violence" (p. xii). Although it is not clear
just what he means by "collective violence," there seems to be very
little support for this statement under any interpretation. Violence
in all forms is increasing, whether it is committed by the political
assassin, 13 the street corner hoodlum,14 the militant demonstrator, 115
10. REPORT 19; Edwards, supra note 7, at 52-53; Norris, Constitutional Law En•
forcement Is Efjective Law Enforcement: Toward a Concept of Police in a Democracy
and a Citizens' Advisory Board, 43 U. DET. L.J. 203, 214 (1965).
11. REPoRT 40. Pressure is mounting for law enforcement officials to provide more
effective protection in ghetto areas, which are increasingly beseiged by crime. In the
Watts district of Los Angeles, California, 2,000 residents petitioned the city for better
protection. Tu.rE, Oct. 4, 1968, at 24. A report by the Anti-Crime Committee of the
New York NAACP advocates "the use of whatever force is necessary to stop a crime or
to apprehend a criminal." 4 CRIM. L. REP. 2269 (Dec. 25, 1968). A similar demand for
better law enforcement in inner-city areas was made manifest several years ago during a meeting of citizens and police at the tenth precinct in Detroit ["the most difficult area to patrol in the city" (Edwards, supra note 7, at 61)): "During the course
of this entire meeting, there was not one complaint about police discrimination or
brutality. In fact, these residents were asking for stricter enforcement measures in
their particular block or neighborhood, rather than wanting to have the police removed." Id.
12. REPORT 19.
13. In addition to the assassinations of Senator Robert F. Kennedy and the Reverend Martin Luther King, which occurred after Cipes completed his book, the
assassinations of President John F. Kennedy, Black Nationalist Malcolm X, and
American Nazi Party leader George Lincoln Rockwell undoubtedly have had significant impact upon public attitudes toward violence in this decade.
14. The President's Crime Commission reported that "about one-half of all robberies are street robberies, and slightly more than one-half involve weapons." REPORT
18. It also revealed that of 297 robberies surveyed in Washington, D.C., injury was
inflicted in twenty-five per cent of them. Id. at 19. In 1967, seventy-six police officers
were killed in the line of duty; the national average from 1960 to 1966 was forty-eight
per year. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME R.EPORTS-1967, at 47
(1968). Almost fourteen of every one hundred police officers (an eleven per cent
increase over 1966) were assaulted during 1967. Id. at 50.
15. During the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago, there were reports of
demonstrators armed with such weapons as razor blades, spiked cork balls, knives,
and ice picks. Although many of these reports were unconfirmed, there is no doubt
that some demonstrators were armed and did engage in violent attacks on the police.
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or the frustrated policeman.16 The ugly fact is that violence breeds
violence, and the social and political unrest in this country has
provided a fertile breeding ground.
In pursuing his thesis that the danger of violent crime is minimal, Cipes points out that "[t]he homicide rate has actually declined
over the past thirty years. The risk of death from murder is one
out of twenty thousand, about the same as the risk of drowning.
The chances of being killed in an accidental fall are twice as great
as those of being murdered, and the chances of being killed in a car
accident are more than four times greater" (p. 5). Using this fact as
support, he concludes that the Crime Commission's Report "demolishes the premise that we are in the midst of a crime wave" (p. 5).
This argument borders on sophistry and is at best an egregious overstatement of the Commission's findings. The Report clearly states
that "there is reason to be alarmed about crime. In fact, just because crime is alarming, those discussing it-and many people must
discuss it often if it is ever to be controlled-have an obligation to
be cool, factual, and precise."17 The Crime Commission also asserts
that "the likelihood of a serious personal attack on any American
in any given year is about I in 550"18 and that since 1940 "[t]he
number of offenses per 100,000 population has tripled for forcible
rape and has doubled for aggravated assault .... The over-all rate
for violent crimes, primarily due to the increased rate for aggravated
assault, now stands at its highest point, well above what it has been
throughout most of the period.'' 19
Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that the public's fears are
largely based upon an unrealistic assessment of the dangers, they
are deeply ingrained within the American psyche. Allaying such
fears, if that is possible, would require a confrontation with the
real as well as the imagined notions about crime. Unfortunately,
Cipes seems insensitive to the non-rational nature of the reflex
toward self preservation which may run counter to logic and reason. Consequently, he relies too heavily upon glib attacks on crime
RIGHTS IN CONFLicr: REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
VENTION OF VIOLENCE s-4 (1968) (Walker Report).

THE

CAUSES

.AND PRE•

16. The disorders accompanying the 1968 Democratic Convention are perhaps the
clearest example of unmitigated police violence; the conduct of the Chicago police
was described as "unrestrained and indiscriminate police violence." Id. at vii. Another
example is the actions of the Law Enforcement Group, made up mostly of New
York City policemen. About 150 of them "attacked a group of Black Panthers and
white sympathizers" in the Brooklyn Criminal Courts building. N.Y. Times, Sept. 5,
1968, at 1, col. 2. See generally P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER-POLICE .ABUSES IN NEW
YORK CITY (1969); E. CRAY, THE BIG BLUE LINE: POLICE POWER vs. HUMAN RIGHTS
(1967).
17. REPORT 49.
18. Id. at 19.
19. Id. at 23.
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statistics and those who compile them.20 Even if Cipes' statistical
analysis is accepted, the demand for a drastic revision of our criminal system would remain. Regardless of the reasons, crime today
is widespread and very visible. As a result, it has become clear to
the average citizen that his society is not as safe as it should be. If
he believes that the repressive proposals of the hawks will provide
greater safety, he may wish to adopt them without consideration of
the problem of assessing the precise dimensions of the threat.
Thus, to a safety-conscious society tangible signs of protection are
far more important than rational analysis.
Finally, Cipes' argument that the alleged crime crisis is only
an illusion created by statistical manipulation21 is not persuasive.
I am aware of the astounding penchant of police and prosecutors
to find a crime wave whenever they seek to maintain their powers.
There has never been a time in our history when someone has not
seen the specter of rampant crime.22 Indeed, the police, J. Edgar
Hoover included, have cried "wolf" and predicted doom so many
times that one cannot help but be suspicious of their present cries
for more power under the same banner. Yet it is one thing to
recognize law enforcement officials as false prophets, and quite
another to conclude that the "wolf" does not exist. With a pasture
full of slaughtered sheep the testimony of the shepherd is superfluous.
It is easy to understand why civil libertarians are reluctant to
20. At one point he argues, with some persuasion, that J. Edgar Hoover's control
of crime statistics has, "as much as any other factor . • . accounted for his phenomenal dominance of American law enforcement" (p. 8).
21. See text accompanying notes 9-19 supra.
22. See Kamisar, When the Cops Were Not "Handcuffed", supra note 5. Justice
Traynor recently reviewed the history of alannism over crime:
Since the early days of the Republic alarmists have described the crime of their
day as a wave, without any reminder that where there's a wave there's an
ocean..•.
Generation after generation the waves of crime went on pounding. The
nineteenth century was no less violent than the eighteenth. In the relatively
tranquil years of the early twentieth century, still tinged with mauve, crime
regularly made headlines to break the peace. World War I came and went, but
crime continued. The years of Prohibition from 1920 to 1933 put criminals in
business and brought home the sorry lesson that crime pays when it consists of
supplying prohibited goods or services to self-styled law-abiding citizens. When
the era of Prohibition ended crime continued, highlighted now by the dubious
activities of those who had flourished on a law that purported law-abiders
mocked. They were now as well able as the latter to hire legal counsel and
they became the first-class citizens of crime, paying for buffer lawyers to counter
police and prosecutors as no penniless or ignorant wretch could do. Another
generation would pass before we recognized a right to counsel for all, and even
then it took additional litigation to extend it to appeals.
Meanwhile the depression thirties came and went, and crime continued.
World ·war II came and went, the Korean War came and went, and crime continued. The fifties ushered in the beginnings of an affiuent society, but not the
end of crime. We learned that it attended affiuence as it had attended depression
and the years of so-called normalcy.
In the sixties we have soared in circles beyond the earth and travelled in
circles around the earth, but we have not put down crime at home.
Traynor, supra note 8, at 185-87.

May 1969]

Recent Books

1455

admit that some drastic revisions of our criminal system may be
necessary to cope with increasing crime. They know only too well
that their admissions will be used against them by many dedicated
crime fighters. Every concession will be repeated, exaggerated, and
interpolated for the "cause." Nevertheless, it would be even more
undesirable to deny the existence of a "crime crisis," because such
a denial attacks the validity of the public's sincere apprehensions
and creates a substantial credibility gap between the advocates of a
calm and rational approach to the problem and the people whom
they would like to convince. It may be wiser to run the risk of being
quoted out of context than to create such alienation.
The question is really one of tactics. Can an advocate of civil
liberties concede that the crime problem is in danger of getting out
of control without undercutting his arguments that the criminal suspect ought to be afforded extensive safeguards even at the cost of releasing guilty men? Since the ultimate decision as to how our criminal system functions is based not on logical necessity but on value
judgments, "law and order" fanatics may seize upon the premise
granted them and conclude that we must halt the march of crime at
any cost.23 What is more, they may be able to convince the public of
the "need" for greater police powers. But the prospect of misinterpretation cannot justify an attempt to mislead the public from viewing the situation in its true perspective. As a nation we must decide
how we are going to deal with the growing malignancy of crime.24 It
is a decision of immense importance to the structure of our society
and it should not be made solely by "enlightened civil libertarians"
seeking social improvement any more than it should be made solely
by the police.
The temple of criminal justice, though incomplete, now provides a meaningful sanctuary from arbitrary, abusive, and unreasonable treatment; it was built from stones which were wrested one
by one from men without compassion for civil liberties. It is a
structure worthy of pride and staunch defense. 25 I do not believe,
23. Justice Goldberg, who believes that "[w]e are justifiably concerned with crime,"
sees the greater danger to be to lessen the safeguards of the criminal suspect, for
"the power of the criminal is nothing compared to the power of the state. . . . ·we
should not rush to abandon our autonomy as individuals just because it creates inefficiencies in the apprehension of criminals. Goldberg, supra note 2, at 673-74.
24. Michael Murphy, former Police Commissioner of New York City, recognized
the danger of a crime war atmosphere. He has adopted President Johnson's conclusion
that "[w]e are not prepared in our democratic system to pay for improved law enforcement by unreasonable limitations on the individual protections which ennoble our
system. • • ." The Supreme Court's Decisions on Defendants' Rights and Criminal
Procedures, 39 F.R.D. 423, 425 (1966).
25. That this structure has been built to withstand the inevitable public demands
for vengeance should be obvious to students of history. Arthur Goldberg has illustrated this point: "But the people of this new nation would not accept a constitution
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however, that the way to defend it is to divert the public's attention
from its existence. If we do not persuade the people that the present
structure should be maintained and strengthened, decades of painstaking construction can be destroyed as easily as a matchstick castle
can be crushed by a well-meaning child. It seems to me that the civil
libertarian's major task is to educate the child, not to trick it.

III.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW

Following his discussion of the amount of crime in America,
Cipes offers a rather loosely connected series of essays on various
aspects of the administration of the criminal law. In most of these
essays he articulates the familiar liberal criticisms of our manifestly
deficient system; but his chapters on Miranda and the police establishment raise particularly important issues which merit further
examination.

A.

"The Meanings of Miranda"

Although it may be impossible to convince the public that there
is no crime crisis, it is not so difficult to demonstrate that salvation
does not lie in unrestrained police power. Unfortunately, The
Crime War does not develop this theme. This is a most distressing
omission because many lessons can be learned from an examination
of a period during which the police were given a free hand in combatting crime. In 1933, for example, most states placed no restrictions on the use of illegally seized evidence and consequently the
search warrant was virtually unknown. 26 Two years earlier, the
Wickersham Commission disclosed that prevailing "interrogation
methods" included application of a rubber hose to the pit of the
stomach or a phone book to the side of the head. 27 Moreover, there
was no prohibition on the use of coerced confessions28 and an indiwithout a Bill of Rights, for they recognized there would be temporary passions,
passing emergencies, and apparent changes of circumstances, any of which might
appear to justify abridgement of individual liberty." Goldberg, supra note 2, at 666.
26. Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented Critics of the Courts,
supra note 5, at 441-42.
27. In 1931 the Commission reported that "the third degree-that is, the use of
physical brutality, or other forms of cruelty, to obtain involuntary confessions or
admissions-is widespread." NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT No. 11, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 4 (1931). Cf.
Traynor, supra note 8, at 204: "[!]hose who equate due process rules with coddling
of criminals have failed dismally to explain why crime flourishes even when there is
not such so-called coddling, even when there is evidence of the very opposite."
28. The exclusion of the first coerced confession was not until 1936 when the
Supreme Court reversed a conviction based on a confession extracted by pure physical violence. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278.
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gent defendant was entitled to appointed counsel only in capital
cases. 29 According to the present war theorists, then, there should
have been less crime in that era since the police were apparently unhindered by the courts, and what crime there was should have been
under control. Yet, in 1933 a Michigan Supreme Court Justice wrote:
"The wave of crime which is sweeping over this country is causing
much alarm to law-abiding people. No banker, business man or
householder seems immune from attack by the burglar, nor is any
man, woman or child, when upon the streets, free from the danger
of being kidnapped or robbed." 30 Another justice echoed this statement of despair and made the now-familiar assertion that the solution could be found "if the hands of the police are unshackled and
if the powers that be will assure them of backing and support."31 In
this context, attacks on recent Supreme Court decisions as a major
source of the increase in crime32 are revealed as lame excuses for a
historic inability to control criminality.33
When the Court announced in 1"\1iranda v. Arizona34 that a suspect in custody could not be interrogated by the police unless he
29. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
llO. People v. Stein, 265 Mich. 610, 616, 251 N.W. 788, 790 (1933) Q'ustice Sharpe,
dissenting). In interesting contrast to this position, David A. Pine, a member of the
District of Columbia Crime Commission, reveals a less sinister recollection of that
period: "That there are other causes would seem to be supported by history. I remember that during the dark days of the Great Depression in the early 1930s there existed
over the land abject poverty, distress and misery, but I do not recall at that time
that there was a vast upsurge in crime." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT 870 (1966) (minority report of David A. Pine).
lll. People v. Stein, 265 Mich. 610, 626, 251 N.W. 788, 793 (1933) Q'ustice Weadock,
dissenting); l'REsIDENT S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF GoLUMBIA, REPORT
at 870.
82. Moreover, this attack has not been limited to the United States Supreme Court.
The now familiar complaint that appellate courts look for error and not justice has
been applied to lower courts as well. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT 872 (minority report of David A. Pine).
88. Professor Kamisar makes this point rather emphatically:
When police-prosecution spokesmen of our day exclaim that "crime is overwhelming our society," I am reminded of a story, apocryphal no doubt, about a
certain aging promiscuous actress. When asked what she would do if she could
live her life all over again, she is said to have replied: "The same thing-with
different people."
I venture to say that today too many law-enforcement spokesmen are doing
"the same thing-with different people." They are u~ing different cases and different crime statistics and they are concentrating on a different target-the
Supreme Court of the United States rather than the state courts, parole boards,
social workers, and "shyster lawyers"-but they are reacting the same way they
reacted in past generations.
When Wasn't There a "Crime Crisis"?, 39 F.R.D. 450, 455 (1966). Abe Krash, a member of the District of Columbia Crime Commission, pointed out one obvious problem
with this approach: "[l]t diverts attention and energy from appropriate remedial
measures." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT
924 (Commissioner Krash, joined by Commissioners Ferguson, Lawson &: Wald).
84. 384 U.S. 486 (1966).
0
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was first informed of and had waived his rights to remain silent and
to have an attorney present, the outcry from law enforcement officials was instantaneous. 35 They claimed that this ruling would
cripple the police and eliminate the use of confessions.36 Although
Cipes devotes a full chapter to Miranda and does a good job of
explaining it to the layman, he never refutes this contention with
the evidence gathered in studies by the Los Angeles District Attorney's Oflice37 and by the Yale Law Journal38-both of which demonstrate that the hysterical denunciations reflected groundless fears. 30
Furthermore, to set the record straight, Cipes should have
pointed out that the Warren Court has not been a "criminal's
court." 40 In Terry v. Ohio,41 for example, the Court approved the
police's zealously sought power to "stop and frisk" a suspect on less
than probable cause. In Hoffa v. United States42 it upheld the right
of the police to plant an informant in a suspect's quarters, and in
Osborn v. United States4 3 it allowed such an informant to tape record a private conversation. Moreover, the Court has protected the
"anonymity of an informer" 44 and the right of the police to extract
blood samples over a suspect's protest,45 or from an unconscious
35. There was a similar outcry when the Supreme Court announced the Escobedo
rule: "[I]t is time we gave ..• [the police] some weapons by which they can try and
safeguard the honest citizens which is the purpose of the entire police force." Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the District of Columbia, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
47 (1965), cited in Traynor, supra note 8, at 197 n.60.
36. As Arthur Goldberg pointed out in his University of Pennsylvania lecture, even
if the number of confessions were reduced, "[the critics] offer no evidence that limiting the fifth amendment would substantially reduce crime." Goldberg, supra note 2,
at 669.
37. E. Younger, "Results of Survey Conducted in the District Attorney'& Office of
Los Angeles County Regarding the Effects of the Dorado and Miranda Decisions upon
the Prosecution of Felony Cases," Aug. 4, 1966.
38. Project-Interrogation in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J.
1519 (1967). Another recently published study corroborates the Yale findings: Medalie,
Zeitz, &: Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt To Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1347 (1968).
39. Justice Traynor commented on the hue and cry after the Escobedo decision,
stating: "Anyone who did take a panoramic view was bound to note that virtually
no one had actually seen policemen in handcuffs. Anyone who followed their activities closely knew that they were still quite able to handcuff others and that they did
so when necessary." Traynor, supra note 8, at 198.
Commissioner Krash has made a similar point: "I know of no empirical studywhich lends support to the conclusion that judicial decisions contribute to the initial
"decisions by offenders to commit a crime." Pru:smENT's COMMISSION ON CRIME IN TIIE
DISTRICT OF Coun.mIA, REPORT 925 (Commissioner Krash, joined by Commissioners
Ferguson, Lawson, &: Wald).
40. See Kamisar, supra note 1, at 15; Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Pro•
cedure, 67 MICH. L. REv. 249 (1968).
41. 392 U .s. 1 (1968).
42. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
43. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
44. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
45. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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person.46 Finally, in Warden v. Hayden 47 the Court reversed a longstanding proscription against the seizure of "mere evidence." 48

B. "Another Look at the Enemies Within"
Beginning this chapter with a famous quotation from Justice
Louis Braideis, Cipes lashes out against improper police conduct:
"If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt
for law .... To declare that in the administration of the criminal
law the end justifies the means-to declare that the Government
may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private
criminal-would bring terrible retribution" (p. 109).49 Cipes does
not move, however, from this initial statement into a general
attack on police lawlessness. This is unfortunate, since the problem of police lawlessness is at the heart of the dispute between the
hawks and the doves of the crime war. 50 The militarists claim
that they cannot eradicate crime if they are restrained by naive
civilian notions of justice,51 while the doves assert that the issues
46. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
47. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
48. One further point as to the adverse effect of Supreme Court decisions is
worth noting:
The fact of life is that so many law enforcement officers disregard or circumvent "liberal" Supreme Court decisions and so many lower courts distinguish,
contain or shrink these decisions down that the so-called "revolution" in constitutional-criminal procedure may more realistically be seen as a process of
reaction and counter-reaction.
Address of Professor Yale Kamisar, Mythology and Reality About Crime and the
Courts, Marshall Wood Lecture Series on Crime in America, Brown University,
Nov. I, 1967.
49. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Justice Brandeis, dissenting).
50. It is not so much that the hawks deny such lawlessness as it is their greater
tolerance of deviations from prescribed behavior:
There is no question but that over the years there have been police abuses, and
there will always be police abuses to some degree. Let me suggest to you that
there is also at the present time a staggering rate of fatalities on the highwayspeople being killed by automobiles. If what you want to do is cut out all police
abuses you can do it by cutting out the interrogation opportunity, at least abuses
on that particular level. And if you want to cut down and practically eliminate
automobile fatalities on the highways and the streets in this country, there is an
easy way to do it: The legislatures can pass laws requiring governors on all
automobiles so that none can go faster than 20 miles an hour. If you want to pay
the price for that kind of security, all right. All I am asking is that you know
what you are getting into.
Inbau, The Supreme Court's Decisions on Defendants' Rights and Criminal Procedures,
39 F.R.D. 441, 444 (1966).
51. The analogy is made unusually clear by a statement of the late Police Chief
of Los Angeles, William Parker: "[The police] are limited like the Yalu River
boundary, and the result of it is that they are losing the war just like we lost the
war in Korea." Transcript of "Are Eavesdropping and Wiretapping Desirable Law
Enforcement Methods?" presented on NBC's "The Nation's Future," July 8, 1961,
reprinted in Hearings on S. 1086, S. 1221, S. 1495, and S. 1822 Before the Subcomm.
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
536 (1961).
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at stake involve far more pressing considerations and that the
generals of the war must be subject to civilian control. 52 Inherent
in the doves' position is distrust of the domestic army. If Cipes
could have demonstrated to his readers that the domestic army
of police has not shown that it can handle unrestrained power
without damaging the fabric of society, he would have laid a substantial foundation for the limitations he advocates. After all, police
lawlessness threatens to undermine the stability of an orderly society in a way that no criminal conduct can. Such behavior "destroys the moral authority of the official agencies of society, teaches
a lesson of lawlessness to the entire community, and provides excuses and inducements for private citizens tempted to violate the
law." 53
Recently, Cincinnati Police Chief S. R. Schrotel phrased the
basic problem as follows: "Among the many countries in which the
common law prevails, the United States stands first in distrust of its
police .... The underlying concern seems to be, not the nature of
the police service, but rather the quality of the police and the manner in which they perform their duties." 54 Among the factors which
have generated such distrust is the recent history of brutality in the
"interrogation" stage of a criminal investigation; 55 another is the
street encounter between citizens and policemen, which all too frequently involves violence. 56 But the major source of distrust is undoubtedly the stubborn refusal of the police to abide by the constitutional standards established by the Supreme Court. 57 Professor
Kamisar has pointed out that while law enforcement officials loudly
Another classic statement of the police position is stated by ex-Police Co=issioner
Murphy: "To impose upon us unreasonable standards and at the same time extend
the constitutional safeguards surrounding the individual is akin to requiring one
boxer to observe the Marquis of Queensbury rules and to permit his opponent to
gouge, strike foul blows and use every unfair advantage as the referee turns his back."
Murphy, supra note 24, at 425.
52. Justice Traynor points out why we need civilian protection: "It is for the
judges, through the enforcement of judicial rules, to remind law-abiders that courts
stand not only between them and the excesses of lawbreakers, but also between them
and the excesses of government." Traynor, supra note 8, at 200.
53. Allen, supra note 3, at 8.
54. Schrotel, Social Change and Police Defenses, in NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON SCIENCE
&: CRnnNAL JUSTICE 77, 78 (1966).
55. See note 27 supra.
56. Even when the street encounters do not involve actual violence, there is a pattern of massive antagonism. Speaking of such street encounters in Detroit, Judge
Edwards states: "[The police] tend to view each person [in the heavy crime areas]
on the street as a potential criminal or enemy, and all too often that attitude is
reciprocated." Edwards, supra note 7, at 54.
57. Professor Norris has noted that "[w]e are in a time of crisis now: a constitutional crisis stemming from an indisposition by too many police officers to observe
the constitution. In time of crisis a democratic society gets its compass and bearing
from democratic principles. A recognition of the principle of civilian sovereignty is
necessary now." Morris, supra note IO, at 213.
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deplore disobedience of society's laws, 58 "too many police chiefs and
prosecutors (and their supporters) have long tolerated, if not encouraged, disobedience of our laws and the judgments of our courts,
which, in their opinion, unduly obstruct them in their pursuit of
suspected criminals." 59 In fact, it was this official inclination for
disobedience which prompted reluctant appellate courts to adopt
the exclusionary rules. Chief Justice Traynor, for instance, stated in
People v. Cahan:
[W]ithout fear of criminal punishment or other discipline, law enforcement officers sworn to support the [federal and state] constitutions, frankly admit their deliberate, flagrant acts in violation of
both Constitutions and the laws enacted thereunder. It is clearly
apparent from their testimony that they casually regard such acts
as nothing more than the performance of their ordinary duties for
which the city employs and pays them. 60

Thus, if the police themselves are unwilling to respect even the
minimal standards of our criminal system, they must be carefully
watched, rather than given more power. In this regard, some discussion by Ci pes of police racism, brutality, and prevarication would
have been useful.
Instead of exposing these lawless elements of police conduct, however, Cipes focuses on the extensive use of informants. While this
permits him to describe "How They Got Jimmy Hoffa," 61 it hardly
goes to the crux of police lawlessness, since this procedure has never
been considered "unlawful" and, in fact, has been clearly upheld
by the Supreme Court.62 Thus, Cipes' vehement attacks against the
police on these grounds is somewhat unfair. It is true that using a
human "bug" to exploit personal relationships raises enormous
questions in terms of the right to privacy. 63 But this productive
tactic, 64 however offensive and immoral, is still sanctioned by the
58. "History shows that every society which became lawless soon succumbed, and
that the first evidences of each society's decay appeared in the toleration of disobedience of its laws and judgments of its courts." Justice Whittaker,. quoted in
Casper, Call Crime to a Screeching Halt, TRIAL, Oct.-Nov. 1968, at 14.
59. Kamisar, supra note 1, at 15.
60. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 437-38, 282 P.2d 905, 907 (1955).
61. It is probably not fair to blame Mr. Cipes for this provocative lead line, but it
is printed on the back cover of the dust jacket.
62. !-!~IFa. v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
63. See Josepno.::-i, Book Review, 15 UCLA L. REv. 1586, 1599-600 (1968).
64. Cipes himself points out that the FBI attributes 7,500 arrests in one year to
informants (p. 112). In addition, Cipes rather strains logic when he says: "For a private
citizen to put a paid informer on the government's payroll is a crime. But five years
later when Kennedy's men did the same thing in reverse, they committed no crime,
at least not according to the Supreme Court" (p. 119). Beyond the surface analogy,
there is a crucial difference between spying to effectuate a crime and spying to detect
one: society has a significant interest in permitting the latter invasion, and none in
permitting the former.
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conscience of the community and is therefore not equivalent to true
police lawlessness. Offensive behavior by the Government takes on
an entirely new dimension when such behavior is also illegal. Accordingly, it probably would have been more meaningful if Cipes
had dealt to a greater extent with the general problem of police
lawlessness.
Furthermore, in view of the purpose of The Crime War, the
total absence of any reference to Mapp v. Ohio 65 and the exclusionary rule is extraordinary. The idea that a guilty man should go free
as a consequence of police misconduct is not a matter of intuitive
justice; 66 it is a pragmatically designed solution to a serious problem,
a solution which many people :find shocking. 67 Few laymen have any
conception of the background of Mapp v. Ohio nor do they realize
how patient the Supreme Court was with blatant and frequent constitutional violations by police. Consequently, it would have been
useful to show how the rule evolved from the inadequacy of other
remedies and the out-and-out refusal of law enforcement officials to
honor the clearest constitutional requirements. 68 When seen in its
proper perspective, Mapp v. Ohio was not a case to protect criminals, but a last-ditch effort to preserve all of the civilized hope
incorporated in the Bill of Rights, a case to call a halt to police
lawlessness.
IV.

CONCLUSION

When one attempts to evaluate a book dealing with a topic of
great interest to the reviewer, there is a tendency to reproach the
author for not saying things the reviewer would have said if he had
written the volume. Although I may have fallen into this trap, I
65. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
66. Justice Traynor describes an attitude the exclusionary rule has created:
[A] known suspect is accused and brought to trial and then thwarts prosecu•
tion by pleading irregularities in his detection, detention, or trial that compel
exclusion of convincing evidence of guilt. Perhaps to black out the large failure
to inquire into the causes of crime, alarmists then rouse the public to righteous
indignation with a vengeance. Short shrift is made of the likelihood that an
accused who escapes on procedural rules and not on the merits will in time be
successfully prosecuted. Instead there is castigation of any court that insists on
applying rules and procedures consistently, regardless of who is accused.
Traynor, supra note 8, at 188-89.
67. Arthur Goldberg explains why many find this procedure shocking.
We can easily see how the first amendment protects us all. But the rights
of a suspected criminal seem less personal. His rights are often characterized
as self-imposed restraints that the law-abiding members of society have adopted only
out of an exaggerated sense of fair play. And when a confession or illegally seized
evidence is excluded from a criminal trial, we hear that we cannot afford to
give such an advantage to the adversary.
Goldberg, supra note 2, at 666-67.
68. See Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented Critics of the
Courts, supra note 5.
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believe that my criticisms of The Crime War are somewhat broader.
The book simply does not hit hard enough in the right places. What
Cipes is trying to do, however, is very important. There is a great
need for perspective today; no element of civilized justice is so
deeply entrenched that it cannot be uprooted during an all-out war
on crime. Public sympathy and understanding must be invoked,
not for the criminal suspect, but for the delicate balance of our
whole legal system. We must not let the instinct for total victory
cause us to escalate blindly the war on crime. With The Crime War,
Robert Cipes has made it clear that he intends to fight the propaganda of the hawks. While his book is not likely to convert our
war-prone society, it will, it is hoped, stimulate discussion and
further writings. That alone makes the effort worthwhile.

Michael S. Josephson,
Assistant Professor of Law,
Wayne State University

